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CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
Lyman P.Q. Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews changes in Virginia corporate and business
law for the period from June 2000 through May 2001. Part II ex-
amines legislative changes in corporate and other business stat-
utes (excluding public service corporation and insurance law is-
sues) based on Virginia General Assembly action in the 2001
session. Part III reviews judicial decisions during the year, in-
cluding decisions addressing agency law, partnership law, and
corporate law issues and principles. This article describes these
decisions and, in several instances, it also critically analyzes the
outcomes. Part IV summarizes a May 25, 2001, Order of the Vir-
ginia State Corporation Commission amending the Commission's
Securities Act Rules.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The 2001 General Assembly enacted several pieces of legisla-
tion that affect business law. The most important legislation pro-
vides (1) procedures whereby foreign corporations can become
Virginia corporations and Virginia corporations can become in-
corporated under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction-so-called
"domestication"'-and (2) procedures for converting domestic lim-
ited liability companies to domestic corporations and domestic
* Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
B.A., 1973, Carleton College, magna cum laude; J.D., 1978, University of Minnesota
School of Law, magna cum laude. Financial support was provided by the Frances Lewis
Law Center, Washington and Lee University. Donald Kannady provided research assis-
tance.
1. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-722.2 to -722.7 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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corporations to domestic limited liability companies.2 These
pieces of legislation are summarized below.
A. Domestication of Corporations; Conversion of Domestic
Corporations and Limited Liability Companies
The 2001 General Assembly adopted legislation, effective July
1, 2002, drawing on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
procedures for (1) domestication of foreign corporations in Vir-
ginia and Virginia corporations in foreign jurisdictions3 and (2)
converting a Virginia limited liability company to a Virginia cor-
poration and a Virginia corporation to a Virginia limited liability
company.4 A foreign corporation may "domesticate" (i.e., essen-
tially, reincorporate) in Virginia by complying with the laws of
the state in which the foreign corporation is incorporated and fil-
ing articles of domestication with the Virginia State Corporation
Commission (the "SCC").5 A Virginia corporation not legally re-
quired to be a domestic corporation may domesticate in a foreign
jurisdiction by obtaining board and shareholder approval of a
plan of domestication6 and filing articles of incorporation surren-
der with the SCC.7
A Virginia corporation may convert into a Virginia limited li-
ability company by obtaining board and shareholder approval of a
plan of entity conversion and filing articles of entity conversion
with the SCC.8 A Virginia limited liability company may convert
into a Virginia corporation by obtaining member approval of a
plan of entity conversion and filing articles of entity conversion
with the SCC.9
The bill also sets forth the effects of domestication ° or conver-
sion on the entity," including transfer of assets and liabilities
2. See id. §§ 13.1-722.8 to -722.14 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
3. Id. §§ 13.1-722.2 to -722.7 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
4. Id. §§ 13.1-722.8 to -722.14 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
5. Id. §§ 13.1-722.2, -722.4 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
6. Id. § 13.1-722.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
7. Id. § 13.1-722.5 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
8. Id. §§ 13.1-722.9, -722.12 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 13.1-722.6 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
11. Id. § 13.1-722.13 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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from the converting entity to the surviving entity, continuation of
legal proceedings by or against the entity, reclassification of
shares and interests, and deemed continuation of the entity with-
out interruption since the date the original entity was organ-
ized. 2 Fees for filing articles of domestication, entity conversion,
or incorporation surrender will be the same as those for filing ar-
ticles of incorporation or organization, 3 except that the SCC may
charge and collect fees for requested expedited handling of busi-
ness entity filings, UCC filings, copies of records, and expedited
provision of services or issuance of certificates. 4
B. Limited Liability Companies
The 2001 General Assembly enacted amendments to the lim-
ited liability company statute to permit formation of a Virginia
limited liability company without any initial members and to
provide procedures and conditions for the admission of members
when a limited liability company has no members at the time of
formation. 5 New legislation also provides that statutory restric-
tions on distributions by limited liability companies do not apply
to payments constituting reasonable compensation for present or
past services or reasonable payments made in the ordinary course
of business pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan or other bene-
fits programs." Legislative amendments also confirm the entity
status of limited liability companies under Virginia statutory law
notwithstanding their status for income tax purposes. 7 This lat-
ter change reflects the fact that limited liability companies may
elect, for income tax purposes, not to be taxpaying entities, but
rather, to allow the "flow through" of income, gains, or losses to
its members. Finally, a new amendment provides procedures for
admitting a member or members to a limited liability company in
12. Id. §§ 13.1-722.6, -722.13 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
13. Id. § 13.1-616(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
14. Id. § 12.1-21.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). This section does not become effective until
July 1, 2002. Id.
15. Id. § 13.1-1038.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
16. Id. § 13.1-1035(E) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
17. See id. § 13.1-1002 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (defining "limited liability company" and
"domestic limited liability company").
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the situation where the last remaining member of the company
has disassociated.' 8
C. Registered Agents for Business Entities
The 2001 General Assembly made a small but important
change to the qualifications of registered agents. Newly enacted
legislation eliminates provisions that permit professional corpora-
tions, limited liability companies, and registered limited liability
partnerships registered with the Virginia State Bar to serve as
registered agents for domestic, foreign stock, and non-stock cor-
porations, 9 limited liability companies,2" limited partnerships,
21
and registered limited liability partnerships.22 Instead of focusing
on registration with the State Bar, the new amendments provide
that those domestic or foreign stock or non-stock corporations,
limited liability companies, or registered limited liability partner-
ships that are authorized to transact business in the Common-
wealth may serve as registered agents.2'
If, however, such a qualified entity is appointed as a registered
agent, it cannot be its own registered agent and, moreover, it
must "designate by [an] instrument in writing, acknowledged be-
fore a notary public, one or more natural persons" to receive any
process, notice, or demand, and it must "continuously maintain at
least one such person at that office."24 Whenever the designated
person accepts service, a photographic copy of such instrument
must be attached to the return.2 5
With respect to limited liability companies, new legislation
provides that a trustee of a trust that is a manager or a member
of the limited liability company may serve as a registered agent.26
For a registered limited liability partnership, the registered agent
18. Id. § 13.1-1038.1(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
19. Id. §§ 13.1-619, -634, -759, -763 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
20. Id. §§ 13.1-1011, -1015 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
21. Id. §§ 50-73.4, -73.11 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
22. Id. §§ 50-73.132, -73.135 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
23. See supra notes 19-22.
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.4(b) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 13.1-1015(A)(2)(a)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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may now be a trustee of a trust that is a general partner of the
registered limited liability partnership.27
D. Securities Act Legislation
The 2001 General Assembly adopted legislation, effective July
1, 2002, amending the exclusion for banks and certain trust sub-
sidiaries with language from the definition of "broker-dealer" un-
der the Virginia Securities Act.28 Banks and trust subsidiaries
will not be considered broker-dealers as a result of engaging in
any one or more of certain activities specified in section 3(a)(4)(B)
or in section 3(a)(5)(C) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.29
Moreover, transactions by a bank pursuant to an unsolicited offer
or order to buy or sell securities are exempted from the securities,
broker-dealer, and agent registration requirements, under Vir-
ginia Code section 13.1-514, if they are "not effected by an em-
ployee of the bank who is also an employee of a broker-dealer."
30
E. Forfeiture of Equity in Agricultural Cooperative Associations
New legislation authorizes the bylaws and member agreements
of an agricultural cooperative association to provide that when an
agricultural cooperative association holds any membership or pa-
tronage equity to the credit of a person who has not had a current
address on file with the association for at least three years, the
bylaws or member agreements may provide that such equity is
forfeited to the association.3 The forfeiture will only occur follow-
ing specified publication procedures and an opportunity for the
equity to be claimed by such person or his next of kin.32 If there is
no such provision in the association's bylaws or members agree-
ments, or if there is no publication, then the Uniform Disposition
of Unclaimed Property Act33 shall apply to such equity.34 Any for-
27. Id. § 50-73.132(A)(i) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
28. See id. § 13.1-501 (Cure. Supp. 2001).
29. Id. The relevant portions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 may be found at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)(B), (a)(5)(c) (Supp. V 1999).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(20) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
3L Id. § 13.1-322(J) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
32. Id.
33. Id. §§ 55-210.1 to -210.30 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
2001]
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feiture completed by an association prior to July 1, 2001, will be
effective if such transfer was in compliance with the bylaws or
member agreements of the association in effect at the time of the
transfer, without regard to the publication requirements set out
in the legislation; therefore, such transfer will not be subject to
the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.35
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Agency Law
1. Agent's Breach of Fiduciary Duty
In Feddeman & Co. v. Langan Associates,36 a certified public
accounting firm sued certain former directors and former employ-
ees for breach of fiduciary duty.37 Those former directors and em-
ployees, along with a competitor accounting firm and its presi-
dent, were also sued for intentional interference with contract
and business expectancies and for violation of Virginia Code sec-
tions 18.2-499 and 18.2-500.18 The Supreme Court of Virginia re-
versed the trial court's grant of defendants' motion to set aside a
jury verdict for plaintiff against all defendants in the amount of
$3,300,000.39
In the Feddeman case, Kent Feddeman, a ninety-five percent
shareholder in and president of a public accounting company, ini-
tiated discussions with John Langan, president of Langan Asso-
ciates, a rival accounting firm, concerning a possible buyout or
merger of the two companies.4 ° As discussions progressed, Mr.
Feddeman asked a director and employee of Feddeman & Com-
pany, Joseph Kotwicki, to handle further negotiations.4' After
34. Id. § 13.1-322(J) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
35. Id. § 13.1-322 editor's note (Cum. Supp. 2001).
36. 260 Va. 35, 530 S.E.2d 668 (2000).
37. Id. at 41, 530 S.E.2d at 672.
38. Id. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 and 18.2-500 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001)
address the "[c]onspiracy to [ilnjure [ainother in [tirade, [blusiness or [p]rofession."
39. Feddeman, 260 Va at 47, 530 S.E.2d at 675.
40. Id. at 38, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
41. Id.
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both Langan Associates and Feddeman & Company rebuffed an
unsolicited buyout offer from the American Express Company,
Kotwicki, along with another director of Feddeman and several
employees of Feddeman, independently decided to act as a group
to attempt a purchase of Mr. Feddeman's ninety-five percent in-
terest in Feddeman & Company, and thereafter, to merge the
company with Langan Associates. 2
After the unsuccessful exchange of an offer and counteroffer
between the management buyout group and Mr. Feddeman, the
directors and employees decided among themselves, with John
Langan's knowledge, that they would resign from Feddeman &
Company on December 1, 1997, in the hope that their announced
resignations would be a form of "leverage" that could strengthen
their negotiating position in purchasing Mr. Feddeman's stock.4"
Further discussions between Mr. Feddeman and the employees
concerning the buyout failed."
On December 1, 1997, the directors and several employees fi-
nalized their decision to resign. 5 Mr. Langan agreed that Langan
Associates would hire the directors and employees. 6 On Decem-
ber 2, Kotwicki delivered eleven letters of resignation to Mr. Fed-
deman, and that evening Langan Associates held a reception for
the Feddeman employees who had not yet resigned.47 Eventually,
twenty-five of the thirty-one Feddeman & Company employees
resigned and began working for Langan Associates.' By Decem-
ber 3, all the Feddeman & Company clients had been contacted
by employees of Langan Associates, and one-half of those clients
eventually transferred their business to Langan Associates. 9
The supreme court first took up the trial court's decision to set
aside the jury verdict that three of the defendants in their capaci-
ties as directors and employees and three other individual defen-
dants in their capacity as employees of Feddeman & Company
42. Id.
43. Id. at 39, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
44. Id. at 39-40, 530 S.E.2d at 670-71.
45. Id. at 40, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 40-41, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
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had breached fiduciary duties to the corporation. 0 The supreme
court acknowledged that employees, prior to resignation, are enti-
tled to make arrangements to resign, including plans to compete
with their employer and that such conduct does not ordinarily re-
sult in liability for breach of fiduciary dutyF1 The court noted,
however, that the employee's right is not absolute and, on a case-
by-case basis, "must be balanced with the importance of the in-
tegrity and fairness attaching to the relationship between em-
ployer and employee or corporation and corporate director."52
After first citing factually similar authority from other jurisdic-
tions, the court focused on those facts that they found most trou-
bling about the director and employee conduct.53 The court noted
that the employee and director defendants had formulated the
plan to resign en masse to exert leverage on Mr. Feddeman in the
buyout discussions, knowing that such a walkout would "be dev-
astating" to the corporation for which they worked. 4 Acting on
that plan, the defendants not only prepared for their own resigna-
tions and advised others of their plans, they essentially solicited
other employees to join them by supplying resignation letters for
use by those employees and telling them that they could also join
rival Langan Associates if they resigned.5 The court concluded
that the totality of the defendants' actions provided credible evi-
dence to support a jury determination that their conduct fell be-
low the required standard of good faith and loyalty owed by both
corporate directors and employees in these circumstances.
In further holding that the trial court erred in setting aside the
jury verdict on the statutory conspiracy count, the court focused
on several meetings between the Feddeman directors and em-
ployees and Langan Associates and its president.57 These meet-
ings were held in an effort to formulate a plan to adversely affect
the plaintiff and thereby impose "leverage" on Mr. Feddeman to
accept a buyout offer, following which the two companies would
50. Id. at 41, 530 S.E.2d at 672.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 42, 530 S.E.2d at 672 (citations omitted).
53. See id. at 42, 530 S.E.2d at 672-73.
54. Id. at 43, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 43-44, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
57. See id. at 45, 530 S.E.2d at 674.
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merge.58 Participation by Langan Associates and John Langan in
the conspiracy was also shown by evidence that Langan Associ-
ates' legal counsel represented the proposed buyers, advised the
buyers concerning the resignation plan, and was paid for these
legal services by Langan Associates.59 The court remanded the
conspiracy count to the trial court for entry of judgment, noting
that the relevant conspiracy statute0 provides for recovery of
treble damages along with costs and attorneys' fees.61
Important to this outcome was the fact that the directors and
employees of Feddeman & Company behaved in a manner detri-
mental to their employer in an effort to extract concessions in a
negotiation to buy the stock of the controlling shareholder of their
employer.62 Notwithstanding this unusual fact, the decision mer-
its close examination by lawyers who counsel employees contem-
plating a change of employment to a rival firm, particularly as to
the danger of soliciting other employees while still employed or
using an employer's proprietary information. Moreover, the deci-
sion shows yet another peril of a lawyer taking on multiple repre-
sentation of clients with potentially conflicting interests, as did
the lawyer representing both Langan Associates and the proposed
buyers of Mr. Feddeman's stock.
2. Agent's Apparent Authority
In Williams Scotsman, Inc. v. Crawford,63 the Staunton Circuit
Court addressed the liability of a principal under the theory of an
agent's apparent authority.' 4 The plaintiff brought an action to
recover a mobile office or the unpaid balance of the purchase price
for the office from defendants Ebeneezer Crawford and Grey-
hound Lines, Inc.65 Mr. Crawford owned and operated a bus ter-
minal in Staunton, Virginia, for a number of years, serving as a
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-500 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cure. Supp. 2001).
6L Feddeman, 260 Va. at 47, 530 S.E.2d at 675.
62. Id. at 43-44, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
63. 53 Va. Cir. 183 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Staunton City).
64. Id. at 183.
65. Id.
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ticket agent for Greyhound.66 After a fire caused the closure of the
bus terminal, defendant Crawford entered into a contract with
the plaintiff to purchase a mobile office for use as a bus termi-
nal.67 Mr. Crawford, having no actual authority from Greyhound
to do so, signed the purchase documentation as "Greyhound
Lines, Inc., by Ebeneezer Crawford."6" At no time during the ne-
gotiations did the plaintiff have any contact with Greyhound, nor
did the plaintiff question Mr. Crawford as to the scope of his au-
thority or contact Greyhound to make any inquiries about or to
verify Mr. Crawford's authority.69
The court observed that the theory of apparent authority ap-
plies to cases in which the principal's conduct indicates to a third
party the existence of an agency relationship. ° The court held
that the plaintiffs claim failed against Greyhound on that theory
because Greyhound had made no manifestations to the plaintiff
about Crawford's authority and had no contact with the plain-
tiff.7 Moreover, Greyhound had not been unjustly enriched be-
cause it did not assert ownership of the mobile office.72 The court
went on to grant judgment in favor of the plaintiff only against
Crawford individually.73 The court did not make explicit the the-
ory of Crawford's liability, although it would appear to be for mis-
representation of authority or for breach of a warranty of author-
ity.7
4
B. Partnership Law
1. Personal Jurisdiction Over Partners
Design88 Ltd. v. Power Uptik Productions, LLC,75 although a
jurisdiction case, should be of interest to business lawyers.
66. Id. at 184.
67. Id. at 183-84.
68. Id. at 184.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 183-86.
73. Id. at 186.
74. See id. at 185-86.
75. 133 F. Supp. 2d 873 (W.D. Va. 2001).
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"Plaintiff Design88, designed, implemented and administered a
website called the Underground Trader. The Underground Trader
website caters to day stock traders, providing services to its
members for a fee."76 The plaintiff and the defendants entered
into a Master Partnership Agreement and often referred to them-
selves as partners.77 As the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia explained:
in furtherance of the partnership, and with the knowledge of defen-
dants, the plaintiff performed most of its duties on behalf of The Un-
derground Trader from the plaintiffs office in Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia ....
Eventually, the relationship between the parties soured, and the de-
fendants terminated their relationship.... The plaintiff brought a
declaratory judgment action against defendants in Virginia state
court, seeking, among other things, a determination that a partner-
ship existed among the parties.
78
The defendants removed the action to federal court and filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alter-
native, transfer.7 9
Senior District Judge James H. Michael, Jr., adopting the mag-
istrate judge's Report and Recommendation, denied the defen-
dants' motion in its entirety." Judge Michael recognized that fed-
eral courts "have been consistent in holding that mere access to a
passive website in the forum state is insufficient to support a
finding of personal jurisdiction.""1 However, as a membership-
based Web site for day trading, Judge Michael concluded that The
Underground Trader could not be viewed as a passive Web site
that simply posts information. 2 Moreover, critical to the conclu-
sion that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants
was the plaintiffs allegation that, throughout the parties' rela-
tionship, the defendants were aware that the plaintiff was per-
forming the predominant amount of work on the Web site from its
76. Id. at 875.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 874, 875.
80. Id. at 878.
81. Id. at 877.
82. Id.
2001]
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Charlottesville office. 3 Judge Michael noted, amusingly, that,
there "being no District Court of Cyberspace, the defendants' ar-
gument that laboring on the Internet defeats traditional personal
jurisdiction is unpersuasive; defendants will have to settle be-
grudgingly for the Western District of Virginia."'
2. Partner's Bankruptcy
In In re Shearin,"5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit examined the interplay of federal bankruptcy law
and Virginia partnership law in addressing what funds could be
recovered by a Chapter 7 trustee from a debtor who was a partner
in a law firm. 6 In 1996, the Shearins "filed a voluntary petition
for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.""7 Under Vir-
ginia partnership law as it then existed, the bankruptcy of any
partner caused a dissolution of the partnership.88 Although dis-
solved, Norman Shearin's law firm did not wind up its partner-
ship affairs at that time or any later date. 9 Instead, the law firm
partners, including Shearin, agreed to continue the business
without liquidation of partnership affairs." Mr. Shearin contin-
ued as an equity partner of the reconstituted partnership."
The bankruptcy court awarded to the trustee Mr. Shearin's
share of the profits of the law firm through the day of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition and in addition, awarded to the trustee
the amount of his capital account as of the same date.92 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina affirmed the bankruptcy court, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the order of the district court. 3
The court of appeals ruled that the debtor's pre-petition part-
nership interest in the law firm became property of the estate
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 224 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 349.
87. Id. at 347.
88. See VA. CODE ANN. § 50-31(5) (Repl. Vol. 1998) (repealed 2000).
89. Shearin, 224 F.3d at 349.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 350 n.5.
92. Id. at 348.
93. Id. at 353.
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under section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.94 The court then
turned to Virginia partnership law to determine the nature of the
debtor's interest in the partnership as of the filing date.95 The
court concluded that the debtor-partner's interest consisted both
of his capital account and the annual profits attributable to his
partnership interest through the date of filing the bankruptcy pe-
tition." The court rejected the debtor's argument that he had no
interest in profits on the date of filing because the law firm's
management committee did not determine a partner's share in
net profits until later, at the fiscal year-end. 7 The court ruled in-
stead that on the filing date the debtor had a legally recognizable
interest in profits even though they were contingent and not sub-
ject to possession until some future time.9"
Although, as the court noted, the outcome was "as good an ap-
proximation as could be made as to what Shearin's interest would
have been, . . . the debtor actually may have gotten off easy.
Even though the court rightly stated that then-effective Virginia
law provided that the bankruptcy of a partner causes a dissolu-
tion of the partnership,' the former partnership act also defined
dissolution as a "change in the relation of the partners caused by
any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distin-
guished from the winding up of the business."'0 ' When a partner
files bankruptcy and then continues in the same business in the
form of a reconstituted partnership, it is arguable that no "disso-
lution," as so defined, has taken place because the partner con-
tinues, rather than ceases, to carry on the same business with the
same partners. Moreover, the provision cited by the court, on
which Shearin relied in contending that, as a reconstituted part-
nership, it held title to the dissolved partnership's assets in the
form of new partnership,0 2 specifically addresses the situation
where the "remaining partners agree or have agreed to continue
94. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (6) (1994).
95. Shearin, 224 F.3d at 349.
96. Id. at 353.
97. Id. at 351 n.8.
98. Id. at 351.
99. Id. at 353.
100. Id. at 349 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 50-31 (Repl. Vol. 1998), repealed by Act of Mar.
20, 1996, ch. 292, 1996 Va. Acts 512).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-29 (Repl. Vol. 1998) (repealed 2000).
102. Shearin, 224 F.3d at 350 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 50-37.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998) (re-
pealed 2000)).
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the business." °3 Arguably, that section did not contemplate a
partner filing bankruptcy and then continuing on in business
with his former partners in a newly reconstituted, but otherwise
identical, partnership. Possibly, in other words, the trustee could
have pursued an even greater portion of the debtor's assets, in-
cluding some portion of his still-existing, post-filing partnership
interest.
This result may not obtain under the new partnership statute
in Virginia, °4 which takes more of an entity approach to partner-
ships.' 6 Under the default provisions of the new law, upon a
partner's bankruptcy, he or she is considered to be "dissociated"
from the partnership.0 6 Upon dissociation, a partner's right to
participate in the management and conduct of the partnership
business terminates, except to wind up.0 7 If the business of the
partnership continues without winding up, the partnership shall
cause the dissociated partner's interest in the partnership to be
purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to statute.0 8
This entity approach to partnership overcomes some, but not all,
of the conceptually murky and metaphysical issues concerning
the nature of partnership relations that arose under the older
partnership statute. The new partnership statute's default provi-
sions also may preclude the gambit seen in the Shearin case of fil-
ing for bankruptcy to cut off creditor claims and then continuing
on in a "new" partnership.0 9
C. Corporation Law
1. Director Fiduciary Duties; Director Business Judgment
Statute; Shareholder Litigation
The most important corporate law decision of the past year was
the ruling of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Simmons v.
Miller.1 '
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-37.1 (Rep. Vol. 1998) (repealed 2000) (emphasis added).
104. Virginia Uniform Partnership Act, id. §§ 50-73.79 to -73.149 (Repl. Vol. 1998 &
Cum. Supp. 2001).
105. See id. § 50-73.87 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
106. Id. § 50-73.109(6)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
107. Id. § 50-73.111 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
108. Id. § 50-73.112 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
110. 261 Va. 561, 544 S.E.2d 666 (2001). Although outside the period covered by this
CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
The facts in Simmons were that, from its inception, "Margaret
C. Miller was the sole officer, director, and shareholder of Las
Palmas Tobacco Ltd., a Virginia corporation that had exclusive
rights to import and distribute Professor Sila brand cigars. . ." in
the eastern United States."' In June 1996,
Miller and Calvert W. Simmons entered into a Stock Subscription
Agreement giving Simmons a 30% ownership interest in Las Palmas
in exchange for $100 and Simmons' guarantee of a $100,000 letter of
credit issued for the benefit of Las Palmas .... Additionally, in a
Shareholders' Agreement, Miller and Simmons agreed that "at a fu-
ture date they would fix a value for their shares and enter into a
Cross-Purchase Agreement."
112
By later discussions, Simmons and Miller were unable to agree on
the valuation of Las Palmas."' In January 1997, Miller sent a let-
ter to Simmons that included an offer to buy his thirty-percent
share of Las Palmas."' Simmons rejected the offer because he felt
his shares were worth considerably more than the price offered by
Miller."
5
In February 1997, Las Palmas ceased doing business because
the Professor Sila cigar company refused to ship any more ci-
gars." 6 Also in February 1997, Miller's lawyer filed articles of or-
ganization for a new company, Las Palmas Tobacco International,
L.L.C. ("International")." An unsigned Limited Liability Com-
pany Operating Agreement listed Miller and Professor Sila as
equal owners in the new L.L.C."' Professor Sila became Interna-
Survey (decisions through May 2001), readers should also be aware of the Supreme Court
of Virginia's June 8, 2001, decision in Flippo v. CSCAssociates III, L.L.C., 262 Va. 48, 547
S.E.2d 216 (2001). The supreme court, in a case involving a limited liability company, in-
terpreted the "reliance on legal counsel" provision in the L.L.C. manager business judg-
ment statute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024.1(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1999). This statute is vir-
tually identical to the corporate director business judgment statute found at VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001). The Flippo decision is must reading
for Virginia business lawyers counselling corporate directors and L.L.C. managers, inas-
much as it rejected a "reliance on legal counsel" defense and affirmed an award of both
compensatory and punitive damages for breach of fidiciary duty. See Flippo, 262 Va. at
53, 58-59, 547 S.E.2d at 219, 222.
11L Simmons, 261 Va. at 566, 544 S.E.2d at 670.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 566-68, 544 S.E.2d at 670-71.
114. Id. at 568, 544 S.E.2d at 670.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 568, 544 S.E.2d at 671.
117. Id. at 569, 544 S.E.2d at 671.
118. Id.
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tional's sole supplier of cigars, and International sold cigars to
some of the customers who had previously purchased from Las
Palmas." 9
Simmons sued Miller, Miller's lawyer, Maria Kear, and other
defendants, one of whom made a successful motion to strike all
counts against him.2 ' Other than Miller, Kear, and the third de-
fendant, all other defendants failed to respond and default judg-
ments were entered against the non-answering defendants.' 2 '
Simmons asserted individual claims against Miller and Kear and
also derivative claims, on behalf of Las Palmas, against them.'22
Several claims were stricken by the trial court at the conclusion
of plaintiffs case in chief.23 The jury returned a verdict against
Miller on eleven counts and a verdict against Kear on three
counts.'24 After post-trial motions, the trial court struck all counts
against Kear and all individual counts against Miller, including a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty, granting judgment to Simmons
only on his derivative claims on behalf of Las Palmas. 25
On appeal, Simmons argued that the trial court erred in grant-
ing Miller's motion to strike the jury's verdict on his individual
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.'26 The jury had returned ver-
dicts in favor of Simmons, individually, in the amount of $10,000
and, derivatively, in the amount of $10,000 for breach of fiduciary
duties.'27 The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court,
although not on the simple ground that sustaining both verdicts
would constitute a penalty or double recovery, but on broader, po-
tentially overbroad, grounds. 28
The court stated that it declined adoption of "a closely held cor-
poration exception to the rule requiring that suits for breach of
fiduciary duty against officers and directors must be brought de-
rivatively on behalf of the corporation and not as individual
119. Id. at 570, 544 S.E.2d at 672.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 570-71, 544 S.E.2d at 672-73.
123. Id. at 571, 544 S.E.2d at 673.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 573, 544 S.E.2d at 674.
128. Id. at 573-77, 544 S.E.2d at 673-76.
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shareholder claims."'29 It is not clear whether the court means
that all suits for breach of fiduciary duty against officers and di-
rectors must be brought derivatively on behalf of the corporation
and that it simply will not recognize individual shareholder
claims for fiduciary duty breaches.3 ° Alternatively, the court
might simply be saying that, on the facts of this case, the wrong-
doing was a wrong to the corporation, and therefore, is derivative
in nature and that, unlike several other states and the American
Law Institute,' Virginia will not allow shareholders of close cor-
porations to bring derivative claims as direct shareholder actions.
If the court means to adopt the first position, it is a radical and
unprecedented departure from established corporate law princi-
ples universally recognized. This is because some wrongs by fidu-
ciaries are wrongs to the corporation as a business entity while
other fiduciary misdeeds are wrongs to shareholders in their
shareholder capacity. Several well-known examples of the latter
can be cited,' 2 including many in Delaware.'33
The court, therefore, misstates Delaware law when it states
that Delaware "has yet to embrace the concept of a direct share-
holder action in a closely held corporation."'34 What the court
should have said is that Delaware refuses, in the close corpora-
tion context, to allow what are admittedly derivative claims to be
brought in the form of direct shareholder claims. When a fiduci-
ary duty claim is personal to the shareholder as a shareholder,
however, Delaware has long allowed the shareholder to sue di-
rectly as an individual. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decision relied on by the Supreme Court of Virginia to
summarize Delaware law... miscites the underlying Delaware
129. Id. at 576, 544 S.E.2d at 675.
130. See id. ("Suits for breach of fiduciary duty... must be brought derivatively on be-
half of the corporation and not as individual shareholder claims."). This would mean, too,
that a prior demand on the board of directors would be required in all fiduciary duty liti-
gation. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
13L See 2 AMIEPcAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01(d), at 17 (1994).
132. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
133. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985). See generally Moran v. Household Infl, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.
1985) (discussing the requirements necessary to maintain a shareholder suit in either a
derivative or an individual capacity under Delaware law).
134. Simmons, 261 Va. at 575, 544 S.E.2d at 675.
135. Id. (citing Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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case of Abelow v. Symonds.136 The referenced Delaware Chancery
Court decision, rather than requiring the minority shareholder to
bring an action derivatively, as the Seventh Circuit states, in fact
allowed the shareholder to bring a direct shareholder action.'37
Furthermore, as the Seventh Circuit opinion itself recognizes,
Delaware recognizes a "special injury" exception that permits a
shareholder to bring a personal action to redress a wrong to the
corporate entity if the wrong inflicts a distinct and disproportion-
ate injury on the investor.'38
In the Simmons case, the initial issue should have been the
usual one of whether the action could fairly be characterized as
personal or derivative in nature. Only if the claim undeniably
was derivative in nature would the issue of allowing a share-
holder to proceed directly on a derivative claim then arise. There
is, in Simmons, a strong argument that the wrongdoing could be
characterized as both personal and derivative, and if anything,
more of a direct wrong to the minority shareholder than to the
corporation.3 9 The most mischievous reading of Simmons would
be to interpret it as saying that all fiduciary duty cases must be
brought derivatively. That is not the law elsewhere and would be
bad policy. The case is best read in the narrowest way possible, as
simply precluding a plaintiff from obtaining a double recovery on
a breach of fiduciary duty claim and as holding that the tradi-
tional distinction between direct and derivative actions will be in-
sisted upon in Virginia.
On another point, the Simmons court in dictum reiterated
what this author considers to be a faulty reading of Virginia Code
section 13.1-690,140 stating that that statute "makes no distinction
between duties of care and loyalty."14 ' The court introduces that
statement by asserting that Virginia Code section 13.1-690 ap-
plies to the "discharge [of] duties as a director, " 142 erroneously
136. 156 A.2d 416 (Del. Ch. 1959).
137. See id. at 420.
138. Bagdon, 916 F.2d at 383 (citing Elster v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 100 A.2d 219, 222
(Del. Ch. 1953)).
139. See Simmons, 261 Va. at 574-75, 544 S.E.2d at 674-75 (2001).
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
141. Simmons, 261 Va. at 577, 544 S.E.2d at 676; see also Lyman Johnson, Misunder-
standing Director Duties: The Strange Case of Virginia, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1127,
1146-58 (1999).
142. Simmons, 261 Va. at 577, 544 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690
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suggesting that the word "duties" in the quoted statutory lan-
guage refers to fiduciary duties when, in fact, that word refers to
the word "duties" in the statutory fount of director power." Nev-
ertheless, the court went on to clearly and properly interpret Vir-
ginia Code section 13.1-690 as applying only where directors ex-
ercise business judgment.' Consequently, when Miller organized
International, a competitor to Las Palmas, she was not exercising
business judgment on behalf of Las Palmas and, accordingly, was
not entitled to the protection of Virginia Code section 13.1-690.
Instead, her conduct was evaluated under the common law duty
of loyalty.
145
This last point is a very important ruling for Virginia corporate
law. It clearly reveals that there is more to a director's fiduciary
duty than the requirements of Virginia Code section 13.1-690.141
Moreover, this applies in the duty of care context as well as in the
Simmons duty of loyalty context. That is, inasmuch as Simmons
has authoritatively interpreted Virginia Code section 13.1-690 as
applying only where directors exercise business judgment, where
directors are charged with wrongdoing that can be characterized
as a violation of care, rather than (as in Simmons) a violation of
loyalty, their conduct will be evaluated under the more demand-
ing common law duty of care-not Virginia Code section 13.1-
690-if they did not exercise business judgment. 47
The remainder of the Simmons opinion addressed the statutory
conspiracy claim, the conversion claim, and the legal malpractice
claim."4 The supreme court upheld the trial court's decision to
strike the malpractice claim.'49 Nonetheless, that claim should
cause business lawyers to proceed very carefully with multiple
representation in the close business context. A lawyer represent-
ing the business entity and/or one or more of the principals
should be crystal clear as to whom exactly they are representing.
(Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001)).
143. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-673 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001) (stating re-
quirements for and duties of board of directors).
144. Simmons, 261 Va. at 577, 544 S.E.2d at 676; see also Johnson, supra note 141, at
1132-41.
145. See Simmons, 261 Va. at 577, 544 S.E.2d at 676.
146. See generally Johnson, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. Simmons, 261 Va. at 577-82, 544 S.E.2d at 676-79.
149. Id. at 580, 544 S.E.2d at 677-78.
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In a recent opinion, 5 ° Judge James Jones, United States Dis-
trict Judge for the Western District of Virginia, Abingdon Divi-
sion, ruled that a close corporation's guarantee of a shareholder's
note is a voidable transaction under Virginia Code section 13.1-
691.151 Briefly, one fifty percent shareholder contracted to buy the
stock of the other fifty percent shareholder of Dunford Roofing,
Inc., a Virginia corporation, for $500,000, payable in monthly in-
stallments over thirteen years at seven percent interest.'52 The
corporation itself agreed to guarantee the full amount of the pur-
chasing shareholder's promissory note.'53
Judge Jones found that, because the selling shareholder also
was a director of the company, the guarantee was a conflict of in-
terest transaction falling within Virginia Code section 13.1-691.1"
Such a transaction is voidable unless the transaction was ap-
proved by directors or shareholders who had no personal interest
in the transaction or unless the transaction was "fair to the cor-
poration."'55 Since there was no approval of the guarantee by dis-
interested directors or shareholders, Judge Jones inquired into
whether the transaction was "fair" to the company.'56 Observing
that fairness included a "fair price" as well as a "fair dealing"
component,157 Judge Jones found that the guarantee was not fair
to the corporation. 5 ' Although such a guarantee could, on the
right facts, be beneficial to the corporation because it might pro-
mote continuity of management, the purchase price and resulting
corporate indebtedness clearly exceeded the fair value of the stock
and, moreover, impaired the company's ability to continue in its
line of business.159 Accordingly, Judge Jones rescinded the corpo-
ration's guarantee but left intact the purchasing shareholder's
150. Dunford Roofing, Inc. v. Earls, No. 1:00CV00025, 2001 WL 396869 (W.D. Va. Apr.
12, 2001).
151. Id. at *8-9 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp.
2001)).
152. Id. at *4-5.
153. Id. at *5.
154. Id. at *8-9.
155. Id. at *8 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691(A) (Rep. Vol. 1999 & Gum. Supp.
2001)).
156. Id. at *8.
157. Id. at *8 (citing Johnson, supra note 141, at 1152).
158. Id. at *9.
159. Id.
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personal obligation to buy and pay for the selling shareholder's
stock.1 6
°
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ruled that the broad protection accorded directors under Virginia
Code section 13.1-690 applies to shelter corporate directors in a
securities fraud matter.161 Plaintiff Richmond Dellastatious sued,
among other defendants, two outside directors for damages in
connection with his purchase of $261,000 worth of securities from
SurroundVision Advanced Imaging, L.L.C.162 The plaintiffs the-
ory against the two outside directors was that they were control
persons having liability under section 20 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934163 and under Virginia Code section 13.1-
522(C) 114 of the Virginia Securities Act.165 Defendants raised the
federal statutory defense that they had acted in good faith, and
the state statutory defense that they "'did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence
of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist."
166
On that basis, the defendants moved for, and the district court
granted, summary judgment.'67
The Fourth Circuit assumed that the defendants were required
to show that they had acted reasonably in order to satisfy Vir-
ginia law. 68 The court stated that one way to determine whether
the outside directors had acted with "reasonable care" under Vir-
ginia Code section 13.1-522(C) was to consider whether they had
complied with the duties set forth in Virginia's corporate statute
at Virginia Code section 13.1-690.169 This is a dubious assertion
built upon faulty reasoning.
First, the court observes that although the few cases interpret-
ing Virginia Code section 13.1-690 have concerned protections af-
160. Id.
161. See Dellastatious v. williams, 242 F.3d 191, 195-96 (4th Cir. 2001).
162. Id. at 193.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(C) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
165. Dellastatious, 242 F.3d at 194. The Virginia Securities Act can be found at VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-501 to -527.3 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
166. Dellastatious, 242 F.3d at 194 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(C) (Repl. Vol.
1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 195.
169. Id.
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forded directors under the business judgment rule, the statutory
text is in no way limited to that.170 The text, however, is limited to
the discharge of those responsibilities assigned to directors under
the enabling framework and policy of state corporate law, not
those assigned by the more regulatory framework and policy of
state securities law. Second, the court states that, in light of the
expansive safe harbor provisions found in Virginia Code section
13.1-690(C), it is unlikely that section 13.1-522(C) would hold di-
rectors to a higher standard of care than that set forth under sec-
tion 13.1-690.17' However, as the Fourth Circuit's own opinion in
WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.'72 makes clear, and as the
Supreme Court of Virginia opinion in Willard v. Moneta Building
Supply, Inc. 173 also explicitly states, Virginia Code section 13.1-
690 deliberately did not adopt the "reasonableness" language
found in the comparable section of the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act'74 statute addressing a director's standard of
conduct. 5 Consequently, inasmuch as the Virginia Securities Act
does adopt a "reasonable care" standard, it is more sensible to
conclude that a higher standard was intended for control persons
under the Virginia Securities Act than was intended for directors
under the Virginia corporate statute.
Finally, the policy underpinnings of the two statutes differ.
Deference to a board of directors' decision under Virginia Code
section 13.1-690 is designed to encourage and facilitate directors
in making business judgments that advance corporate and share-
holder interests, without fearing liability under a "reasonable-
ness" standard in the'event those decisions, in hindsight, are un-
successful. The policy aim, in short, is to have a low liability
standard in the hope of advancing shareholder welfare by en-
couraging directors to act without fear of legal liability. By way of
170. Id. at 196.
171. Id. at 195.
172. 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995).
173. 258 Va. 140, 515 S.E.2d 277 (1999).
174. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1998).
175. See WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1185; Willard, 258 Va. at 151, 515 S.E.2d at 284.
In adopting Code § 13.1-690, the General Assembly rejected § 8.30 of the Re-
vised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA).... [Requiring directors] to
discharge the duties of the office in good faith, with the care that an ordinary
prudent person ... would exercise... [believing it] to be in the best interests
of the corporation.
Willard, 258 Va. at 151, 515 S.E.2d at 284 (internal citations omitted).
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contrast, the policy aim of securities law is investor protection
and deterrence, specifically, to encourage those in control of the
corporation, through risk of legal sanction, to ensure that they
are using "reasonable care" in overseeing the corporation's capi-
tal-raising activities.
Notwithstanding these objections, the Dellastatious court
stated that the two outside directors complied with Virginia's
standards for directorial duties "and they likewise acted with rea-
sonable care under § 13.1-522(C)."'76 Thus, although the court ini-
tially stated that it was looking to Virginia Code section 13.1-690
as one way to determine whether the outside directors had acted
with "reasonable care" under Virginia Code section 13.1-522(C),
the court appears to have backstopped that ruling by separately
finding that the directors had acted reasonably, as required under
Virginia's securities laws.'77 Having found that the outside direc-
tors satisfied the standard of Virginia's good faith and reasonable
care defense, the court found that they also qualified for the de-
fense under federal law and, therefore, affirmed a grant of sum-
mary judgment in their favor.7 '
2. Piercing the Corporate Veil; Reverse Piercing
A Fairfax Circuit Court case addressed the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil and held that the veil should not be pierced."9
The plaintiff, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company of New
York, having obtained judgments against certain individual de-
fendants and a Virginia corporation ("Madison-VA"), sought to
collect on that judgment from the assets of a related Maryland
corporation ("Madison-MD"). 8 ° The plaintiff argued that Madi-
son-MD was the alter ego of Madison-VA and, therefore, the cor-
porate veil of Madison-MD should be pierced, allowing the plain-
tiff to collect from the assets of Madison-MD.'
The court first reviewed applicable Virginia law, noting that
176. Dellastatious, 242 F.3d at 196.
177. Id. at 197.
178. Id.
179. See Fid. Nafl Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Madison Title & Escrow, Inc., 53 Va. Cir.
116, 116 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Fairfax County).
180. Id. at 118.
181. See id.
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piercing is "an extraordinary exception to be permitted only when
it becomes necessary to promote justice."82 The court noted, too,
that proof of domination or control of a company is not sufficient
to pierce the veil.1 3 Rather, the plaintiff must also establish that
the corporation was a device or sham used to disguise wrongs, ob-
scure fraud, or conceal crime.1 4 The court concluded that the evi-
dence presented did not satisfy that standard because confusion
as to the identity of two corporations is not enough to pierce the
corporate veil.'85 Moreover, any confusion in the case before him
was to no one's detriment because the plaintiff was not an inno-
cent, gullible member of the public but instead had sophisticated
counsel who prepared separate contracts in its dealings with the
two corporations.
186
In C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Limited Partnership,"7 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
in denying cross-motions for summary judgment, concluded that
Virginia would recognize a cause of action for "reverse piercing" of
the corporate veil.' In a traditional veil-piercing action, a court
disregards the existence of the corporate entity so that a claimant
can reach the assets of a corporate insider, typically a natural
person.8 9 In a reverse piercing action, however, the plaintiff
seeks to reach the assets of a corporation (or limited partnership
or other business entity) to satisfy claims held against a corporate
insider.190
Plaintiff C.F. Trust held judgments against defendants Barrie
Peterson, individually, Barrie Peterson as a trustee, and Nancy
Peterson, in the amount of $6.1 million. 91 Plaintiff Atlantic Fund-
ing Corporation held a judgment against Barrie Peterson indi-
vidually and as trustee in the amount of $1.2 million. 9 2 The
182. Id. (citing Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 234 Va. 207, 212, 360
S.E.2d 828, 831 (1987)).
183. Id. at 119.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 120.
186. Id. at 119.
187. 111 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Va. 2000).
188. Id. at 740.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 737.
192. Id.
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plaintiffs brought suit against three Virginia corporations wholly
owned and controlled by Barrie Peterson and against a limited
partnership in which Barrie Peterson was a forty-nine percent
limited partner. 3
The plaintiff alleged that, during and after the time the initial
judgment had been entered, the defendants engaged in numerous
transactions among themselves for the purpose of avoiding Barrie
Peterson's obligations to the plaintiffs. 4 The plaintiffs contended
that Mr. Peterson had used these various business entities as his
alter ego, and thus, sought access to their assets. 9 5 Being a diver-
sity case, the court had to apply state law and, inasmuch as the
Supreme Court of Virginia has not yet addressed the reverse
piercing doctrine, was required to determine whether the su-
preme court would recognize that theory of recovery. 96
The district court first looked at decisional authority, including
a 1998 decision by the Court of Appeals of Virginia recognizing
the reverse piercing cause of action, 97 and found that reverse
piercing actions are gradually gaining acceptance throughout the
country.'98 The court next looked at policy considerations and ob-
served that the rationale for traditional piercing operates with
equal force in support of reverse piercing.' 9 In both instances,
when the corporate or other organizational form is abused, courts
may, in appropriate circumstances, disregard the entity fiction
whether the fiction is used to shield the owner's assets from
claims against the corporation or to shield the entity's assets from
claims against the owner. °0
The court, having concluded Virginia would recognize the re-
verse piercing doctrine, went on to articulate the standard for
such a piercing. The court cited Supreme Court of Virginia au-
thority that there is "no single rule or criterion... to determine
whether piercing the corporate veil is justified."20 ' The determina-
193. Id. at 738.
194. Id. at 739.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 740-41.
197. Fox v. Fox, No. 0721-97-4, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 157 (Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1998) (un-
published decision).
198. C.F. Trust, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 740.
199. Id. at 741.
200. See id.
201. Id. (quoting O'Hazza v. Executive Credit Corp., 246 Va. 111, 115, 431 S.E.2d 318,
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tion is a "fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances surrounding
the corporation, the related parties, and the acts in question."2°2 It
is not enough, under Virginia law, for the plaintiff to establish
that an individual had control over the corporation or that the
corporate entity was the alter ego of the individuals.2 3 In addi-
tion, the plaintiff must establish that the corporation (or other
business entity) was used "to evade a personal obligation, to per-
petrate fraud or a crime, to commit an injustice, or to gain an un-
fair advantage."2 4 The court went on to rule that only an organi-
zation such as a corporation or partnership could be the alter ego
of another individual and that one individual cannot be the alter
ego of another individual.2 5
3. Preemptive Rights
An Alexandria Circuit Court decision addressed the issue of
whether an option holder has preemptive rights to acquire a pro
rata amount of shares to be newly issued by a corporation.2 6 Un-
der Virginia Code section 13.1-651(A), °7 shareholders of a corpo-
ration have preemptive rights to purchase new issuances of stock
unless that right is negated in the articles of incorporation.2 8
Looking to the definition of "shareholder" found in Virginia Code
section 13.1-603,209 the court concluded that an option holder is
not a "shareholder" and, therefore, does not have preemptive
rights.210
4. Oppression of Minority Shareholder; Custodian Pendente Lite
In Berman v. Physical Medicine Associates,21' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law,
320 (1993)).
202. Id. at 741-42.
203. Id. at 742.
204. Id. (quoting O'Hazza, 246 Va. at 115, 431 S.E.2d at 320).
205. Id. at 744.
206. See Statoil Energy, Inc. v. Hayes, 52 Va. Cir. 406 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Alexandria City).
207. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-651(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
208. Id.
209. Id. § 13.1-603 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
210. See Statoil Energy, 52 Va. Cir. at 407.
211. 225 F.3d 429 (4th Cir. 2000).
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addressed the interplay of fiduciary duties and explicit contrac-
tual protections in the close corporation setting. The plaintiff, Dr.
William S. Berman, was a stockholder, director, and employee of
defendant Physical Medicine Associates, Ltd., a Virginia medical
corporation having six physician-stockholders, five physician-
directors, and six physicians as employees.212 After the director of
a nursing home client of the corporation observed the plaintiff
yelling at nursing home personnel, the director stated that she
did not want Berman to return to the nursing home, and if he did
come back, the firm's doctors would be asked to stop seeing pa-
tients at the home.213 On learning of the complaint and that his
colleagues might insist that he make amends, the plaintiff sub-
mitted a letter of resignation effective nine months later.21 4 The
purpose of giving nine months notice was that such notice was
necessary to entitle a physician-employee to severance benefits
pursuant to an employment agreement each physician had with
the corporation.215 After receiving the letter of resignation, and af-
ter a stockholder meeting attended by all stockholders except
Berman and where Berman's conduct at the nursing home was
discussed, the six other directors met and voted unanimously to
dismiss Berman as an employee pursuant to his employment
agreement, which permitted discharge "for reasonable cause."
21 6
After being discharged, Berman filed an action claiming that
the corporation, its directors, and its stockholders had breached
his employment agreement, his severance benefit agreement, and
a stockholder agreement. 217 The stockholder agreement claim was
settled by payment of $50,000, in accordance with its terms.21 8
Berman also alleged that the directors of the medical corporation
had breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care owed
to him.21 9 The contractual claims for breach of the employment
agreement and severance benefit agreement resulted in a jury
verdict for Berman of over $4,900.220 The trial court granted de-
212. Id. at 430.
213. Id. at 431.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 432.
216. Id. at 431-32.
217. Id. at 432.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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fendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the fiduciary
duty claims, concluding that while the directors owed a fiduciary
duty to the stockholders as a class, they owed no such duty to
Berman as an individual stockholder.22' Berman appealed that
ruling, contending that the directors did owe him a fiduciary duty
as an individual stockholder, and that because the corporation
had essentially operated as a partnership, its stockholders owed
each other the fiduciary duties owed by partners to one an-
other.222
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[tthe question
whether the fiduciary duty of a director of a close corporation
runs to stockholders individually, as well as to stockholders as a
class, does not appear to have been decided in Virginia."223 The
court did not believe it was necessary to resolve that question,
however, because it decided the case on different grounds.224
First, Berman's only claim directly implicating his status as a
stockholder was a violation of a stockholder agreement, which
was settled by payment in full of $50,000 as provided in the
stockholder agreement.225 His other claims implicated his status
not as a stockholder but as an employee.226 His interests as an
employee arose only from breach of the contractual duties owed
by the corporation, not from breach of any fiduciary duties owed
by the directors.227 Those contractual claims were submitted to
the jury, which found for Berman.228
Second, distinguishing a case heavily relied upon by Berman,229
the court ruled that shareholders in close corporations in Virginia
do not have partner-like fiduciary duties in the usual case.23°
Rather, having chosen the corporate form of business and having
operated fully in accordance with proper corporate procedures,
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 433; see also supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text (discussing fiduci-
ary duty in the context of a closely held corporation).
224. Berman, 225 F.3d at 433.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing, P.C. v. Payne, Gates, Farthing & Radd, P.C.,
244 Va. 418, 422 S.E.2d 784 (1992).
230. Berman, 225 F.3d at 434.
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partner-like fiduciary duties would not be imputed upon defen-
dants in this case.23'
The Berman case warrants comment for three reasons. First, it
shows the importance of addressing close corporation affairs by
express contract, including the use of stockholder agreements and
employment agreements. Doing so may lead courts, for the most
part, to look to those express contractual understandings to adju-
dicate the rights and responsibilities of the participants. In cer-
tain instances, however, non-contractual fiduciary duties may
still govern on matters not specifically and pointedly addressed in
those contracts.
Second, as to the question passed over by the court of appeals-
whether the fiduciary duty of a director of a close corporation
runs to stockholders individually-a word of caution is in order.
Generally, of course, director fiduciary duties run to stockholders
as a class. Frequently, however, directors or shareholders who
control corporate affairs in a close corporation act to oppress or
unfairly disadvantage one or more minority shareholders in the
corporation."2 On proper facts, such oppression or unfair conduct
might be regarded as a breach of fiduciary duty running to those
minority shareholders, especially when they lack contractual pro-
tections, and such minority shareholders should be held to have
an individual claim against the directors or other persons in con-
trol. An example would be where a minority shareholder, not hav-
ing any express contractual protections, is terminated from long-
held employment solely because the other persons in control want
to completely block that shareholder's access to any corporate
funds as a prelude to making an unreasonably low offer to pur-
chase his stock.
Third, the purported distinction between the supposedly robust
fiduciary duties owed by Virginia partners and, depending on fu-
ture developments on the second issue above, the potentially non-
existent fiduciary duties owed by shareholders to one another in
close Virginia corporations is formalistic, not well-grounded, and
is likely to be revisited in future decisions.
231 See id.
232. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001) (providing
courts with the power to dissolve a corporation if "It]he directors or those in control of the
corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent").
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A recent decision of the Loudoun Circuit Court,233 wherein the
court appointed a custodian pendente lite pursuant to Virginia
Code section 13.1-747(E), demonstrates an individual share-
holder's claim for oppression and corporate waste. 4 The plaintiff
owned a share certificate duly issued by the corporation indicat-
ing that he was the owner of forty shares of common stock.235 The
shares were issued pursuant to a land transfer agreement be-
tween the plaintiff and the corporation, which provided that
plaintiff would transfer ownership of fifty-five acres of real estate
in exchange for the forty shares of stock.2 36 Although as of the
date of the hearing the plaintiff had not executed a deed convey-
ing the property to the corporation, the property was shown on
the corporation's financial statements as an asset of the corpora-
tion.237 The board of directors of the corporation met and acted to
cancel plaintiffs shares.23 The court noted that summary cancel-
lation of the shares, if later proven to be unjustified, would consti-
tute oppressive conduct or fraud, and accordingly, warranted the
appointment of a temporary custodian for corporate affairs.239
The facts of this case provide an example of one shareholder al-
leging that directors acted oppressively toward him individually.
Directors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders that includes a
duty not to unfairly or oppressively treat one or more of the
shareholders of the corporation.
5. Dissolution; Director Liability
A Richmond Circuit Court decision addressed the issue of di-
rector liability for mishandling corporate assets upon dissolu-
tion.2 40 The plaintiff, a creditor of a dissolved corporation, sought
to hold the former directors individually liable for the corporate
233. Fettig v. Touchstone Dev., No. 20492, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 16 (Cir. Ct. Jan. 8,
2001) (Loudoun County).
234. See id. at *4.
235. Id. at *1.
236. Id. at *1-2.
237. Id. at *2.
238. Id. at *2-3.
239. Id. at *3-4.
240. Crews & Hancock, P.L.C. v. RKR Health Mgmt., Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 284 (Cir. Ct.
2000) (Richmond City).
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debt on the grounds that they had not only failed to properly dis-
solve the corporation, but that they had also taken possession of
the corporate assets and converted them to their own use."4 The
circuit court, citing a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in-
volving Virginia law, 2 held that directors in such circumstances
were personally liable to creditors, but only up to the value of the
corporation's assets at the time of dissolution, taking into account
debts owed to other creditors.243 In the case at bar, the plaintiff
failed to carry its burden of proof on the value of the corporation's
assets, and hence, judgment was entered in favor of the individ-
ual defendants.'
6. Distributions to Shareholders
In Federal Trade Commission ex rel. Earley v. Med Resorts In-
ternational, Inc.,245 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois addressed the propriety of a distribu-
tion to shareholders under Virginia Code section 13.1-653.246 In
that case, the Federal Trade Commission and the Commonwealth
of Virginia sued several corporations for violations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act24 and the Virginia Consumer Protection
Act, 8 alleging fraudulent and deceptive practices in the sale of
vacation services.249 The plaintiff sought, and was granted, in-
terim injunctive relief, a temporary freeze of corporate assets, and
the appointment of a temporary receiver.25
Two of the corporate defendants had made elections under fed-
eral income tax law whereby income and losses of the corporation
"flow through" to the shareholder so that the shareholder reports
the income or loss, as the case may be, on his or her personal in-
241. Id. at 286.
242. See Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, 841 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1988).
243. Crews & Hancock, 52 Va. Cir. at 287.
244. Id. at 287-88.
245. No. 00C4893, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18862 (N.D. Mll. Dec. 22, 2000).
246. See id. at *16-21. The Virginia shareholder distribution statute is found at VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-653 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
247. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1994 & Supp. Vol. 1999).
248. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
249. Med Resorts, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18862, at *6.
250. Id.
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come tax return."' The sole shareholder of these two income tax
"S corporations," '  one of which was a Virginia corporation,
moved the district court to allow the corporations to make sub-
stantial distributions to him as shareholder." 3 He argued that he
needed the funds to pay the tax liability he would personally in-
cur from the five million dollars the two companies expected to
earn for fiscal year 2000.254
The court denied the shareholders' motion on two grounds, not-
ing first that the parties had stipulated that there was good cause
to believe the plaintiffs would ultimately succeed in establishing
that the defendants had engaged in acts that violated the Federal
Trade Commission Act and other federal and state laws. 5 Thus,
in order to preserve corporate assets for the benefit of those con-
sumers who might demonstrate harm caused by such violations,
the court refused to lift the asset freeze, notwithstanding the fact
that this meant the shareholder would have substantial corporate
income passed through to him without any corresponding corpo-
rate distribution to pay the tax liability.25 5
Second, the court noted that under Virginia Code section 13.1-
653, a board of directors of a Virginia corporation is prohibited
from distributing money to its shareholders if, after distribution
has been given effect, "'the corporation would not be able to pay
its debts as they become due" or "'the corporation's total assets
would be less than the sum of its total liabilities.' 257 Noting that
"[tihe effect of a distribution is measured as of the date the distri-
bution is authorized if the payment occurs within 120 days after
the date of authorization," the court refused to modify the asset
freeze. Substantial claims by a secured creditor and by the de-
frauded consumers as probable unsecured creditors were of suffi-
cient size and probability of success that the corporate defendants
could not, in the court's view, be considered solvent in either the
equity or balance sheet sense. 9 Accordingly, the motion to allow
251. Id. at *4-5.
252. See 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
253. Med Resorts, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18862, at *6-7.
254. Id. at *5 n.4.
255. Id. at *15.
256. Id. at *16.
257. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-653(c)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
258. Id. at "16 n.10.
259 Id. at *18-19-
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a distribution to the shareholder was denied on the ground that it
would violate Virginia's corporate statute.26 °
7. Dissenter's Rights; Fair Value of Shares
In U.S. Inspect, Inc. v. McGreevy,26' Judge Stanley Klein of the
Fairfax Circuit Court addressed an important corporate law is-
sue-the proper methodology for valuing shares where dissenters'
rights are exercised. 2 In a merger of a Virginia corporation into
its wholly owned subsidiary, a Delaware corporation, a share-
holder of the plaintiff, Noris McGreevy, properly exercised her
dissenter's rights under Virginia Code section 13.1-729.263 The
corporation and Mrs. McGreevy failed to agree as to the proper
valuation of her stock.2" A statutory proceeding to determine the
fair value of her shares ensued.265
Judge Klein first reviewed Virginia common law and changes
in the statutory law regarding the rights of dissenting sharehold-
ers.266 After doing so, he concluded that a court in Virginia should
value a dissenting shareholder's stock based upon his or her pro-
portionate interest in the merging company as a going concern,
prior to consummation of the merger.26" He then determined the
full panoply of elements of value to be considered in gauging such
interest in the company as a going concern, and within that ana-
lytical framework, the court focused on an income approach to
valuation.268 The two competing expert witnesses agreed that an
asset approach would seriously undervalue the corporation, and
the court itself found that a market approach evaluation was in-
260. Id. at *19.
261. No. 160966,2000 WL 33232337 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000) (Fairfax County).
262. See id. at *2.
263. Id. at *1. The Dissenter's Rights article of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act is
found at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-729 to -741 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
264. McGreevy, 2000 WL 33232337, at *1.
265. Id.
266. See id. at *1-5.
267. See id. at *5.
268. See id. (discussing the various methodologies available to value a closely held cor-
poration under the "income" approach).
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appropriate given the lack of comparable companies needed for a
market approach analysis.269
After conducting a fairly sophisticated discounted future cash
flow analysis, the court took up the question-which it considered
to be a matter of first impression in the Commonwealth--of
whether to impose a minority discount, a marketability discount,
or a control premium to the value of the stock so arrived at.' Af-
ter reviewing authority from other jurisdictions, the court con-
cluded that, in Virginia, no minority discount should be applied in
a proceeding under Virginia Code section 13.1-740,7 and fur-
thermore, that absent "extraordinary circumstances," none of
which existed in the case at bar, a marketability discount also
was inappropriate.2 Finally, Judge Klein refused to include any
control premium on the facts before him.2 73 Having determined
the value of the corporation as a going concern under the ap-
proach described, Judge Klein then valued Mrs. McGreevy's pro-
portionate share thereof, to which he added an interest factor. 4
IV. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION SECURITIES ACT RULES
By order dated May 25, 2001 ("Order"), the SCC adopted an or-
der amending the SCC's Securities Act Rules. 5 The amendments
became effective July 1, 2001.276 This section briefly summarizes
those amendments.
The Order amends Securities Act Rule 21 VAC 5-20-10 by pro-
viding that an application for registration as a broker-dealer by a
NASD member is to comply with all requirements of the
NASAA\NASD Central Registration Depository system. 7
Application for registration as any other broker-dealer must be
269. See id. at *6
270. Id. at *10.
271. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-740 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
272. McGreevy, 2000 WL 33232337, at *12.
273. Id. at *12-13.
274. Id. at *17.
275. See State Corporation Commission Order Adopting Amended Rules, 17 Va. Regs.
Reg. 2924 (June 18, 2001).
276. Id.
277. Application for Registration as a Broker-Dealer Regulation, 17 Va. Regs. Reg.
2310 (Apr. 23, 2001) (adopted as proposed 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2924, 2925 (June 18, 2001))
(to be codified at 21 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-10).
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cation for registration as any other broker-dealer must be filed
with the SCC in compliance with forms prescribed by the SCC.
278
The amendment to Rule 21 VAC 5-20-10 details what information
the application must include. 9
The Order adopts Regulation 21 VAC 5-20-85 regulating the
registration of Canadian broker-dealers engaging in limited
transactions in securities.28 ' Securities Act Regulation 21 VAC 5-
20-155 provides for agent registration of a Canadian broker-
dealer engaged in limited securities transactions.28 '
The Order amends Securities Act Regulation 21 VAC 5-20-240
to add a new subparagraph "F" governing access to broker-dealer
records.282 The Order repeals Regulation 21 VAC 5-30-30 dealing
with refunds of fees paid by unit investment trusts.283 It also re-
peals Regulation 21 VAC 5-30-60 dealing with requirements for
renewal applications filed pursuant to Virginia Code section 13.1-512.2
The Order amends Regulation 21 VAC 5-30-80 by updating the
NASAA statements of policy that will apply to the registration of
securities in Virginia.285 The Order amends Regulation 21 VAC 5-
80-10 by providing that registration as an investment advisor
shall be filed in compliance with all requirements of the Invest-
ment Advisor Registration Depository (IARD) system. 86 The Or-
der makes certain other technical changes with respect to the reg-
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. Limited Canadian Broker-Dealer Registration Regulation, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2925
(June 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-85).
281. Limited Canadian Broker-Dealer Agent Registration Regulation, 17 Va. Regs.
Reg. 2926 (June 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-155).
282. Books and Records of Broker-Dealers Regulation, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2315, 2317
(Apr. 23, 2001) (adopted as proposed 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2924, 2926 (June 18, 2001)) (to be
codified at 21 VA. AmaiN. CODE § 5-20-240(F)).
283. 21 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-30-30 (1996), repealed by 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2322 (Apr. 23,
2001) (adopted as proposed 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2924, 2931 (June 18, 2001)).
284. 21 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-30-60 (Cum. Supp. 2001), repealed by 17 Va. Regs. Reg.
2322 (Apr. 23, 2001) (adopted as proposed 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2924, 2931 (June 18, 2001)).
285. Adoption of NASAA Statements of Policy Regulation, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2322 (Apr.
23, 2001) (adopted as proposed 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2924, 2931 (June 18, 2001)) (to be codi-
fied at 21 VA. ADmiN. CODE § 5-30-80).
286. Application for Registration as an Investment Advisor and Notice Filing as a Fed-
eral Covered Advisor Regulation, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2323 (Apr. 23, 2001) (adopted as pro-
posed 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2924, 2931 (June 18, 2001)) (to be codified at 21 VA. ADmIN. CODE
§ 5-80-10).
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istration of investment advisors and "federal covered advisors."2 7
One of the more important changes is that the Order amends
Regulation 21 VAC 5-80-160 by adding a new section K governing
access by the SCC to the investment advisor's records.8
Another important clarifying change, welcomed by account-
ants, is the amendment of Regulation 21 VAC 5-80-210 by adding
a new section C excluding from the term "investment advisor":
any certified public accountant who holds a valid CPA certificate as
defined by § 54.1-2000 of Title 54.1 of the Code of Virginia and who
during the ordinary course of business does the following:
1. Issues publications, writings, reports, or testimony in a court of
law or in an arbitration as to the value of privately held securities in
a transaction involving the purchase, sale or valuation of a business;
2. Issues publications, writings, reports or testimony in a court of
law or in an arbitration as to the advisability of investing in, pur-
chasing, or selling privately held securities in a transaction involving
the purchase, sale or valuation of a business; or
3. Advises clients about the disposition or value of assets, of which
ownership is evidenced by privately held securities and such assets
are the subject of (i) bankruptcy, (ii) estate or gift planning or set-
tlement, (iii) divorce, (iv) sale of a business, whether whole or in
part, (v) employee stock option plan, or (vi) an insurance settle-
ment.
289
There are other technical changes to the Securities Act Rules
made by the Order that also should be examined by lawyers prac-
ticing in this area.
V. CONCLUSION
The General Assembly and the SCC made several business law
changes over the past year, but most of the action was in the judi-
cial arena. Courts over the past year issued many significant rul-
287. See Updates and Amendments Regulation, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2323 (Apr. 23, 2001)
(adopted as proposed 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2924, 2931 (June 18, 2001)) (to be codified at 21
VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-80-40).
288. Recordkeeping Requirements for Investment Advisors Regulation, 17 Va. Regs.
Reg. 2308, 2328 (Apr. 23, 2001) (adopted as proposed 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2924, 2931 (June
18, 2001)) (to be codified at 21 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-80-160(K)).
289. Exclusions from Definition of"Investment Advisor" and "Federal Covered Advisor"
Regulation, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2308, 2331 (Apr. 23, 2001) (adopted as proposed 17 Va.
Regs. Reg. 2924, 2931 (June 18, 2001)) (to be codified at 21 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-80-210).
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ings in business law. Especially important-in Virginia as else-
where-are those decisions addressing the fiduciary duties of
those who manage or control business organizations. These deci-
sions settle some issues and yet raise others. In all events, they
warrant attention from both litigators and business lawyers.

